This is despite the fact that such aid could result in increased global demand and thus contribute to reactivation of world trade in a recovery of production. There is nothing in the present state of deflationary chain reactions in the industrialised world, stagnation feeding inflation, which would argue against such an increase in financial aid.
This impressive call for action was given by no less than M. de Larosière, Managing Director of the IMF, speaking at UNCTAD V in Manila. Since March, with no easing of stagflation in spite of heavy doses of monetarist medicine in many countries, the world economy has moved closer to recession. Aid transfers are being restrainedand sometimes cutand other financial flows are increasingly put in jeopardy by fears of mounting debt.
In fact, a consensus resolution was reached on these matters at UNCTAD V, in the committee on the transfer of real resources. Amongst other points, this stated that substantially increased transfers of resources to developing countries are an indispensable factor for accelerating their pace of development and could help stimulate global economic activity, particularly in a medium to long-term perspective. The committee noted that several approaches, including co-financing with private resources, could usefully be combined in order substantially to increase transfers of resources, largely raised on the financial markets and without prejudice to official development assistance Unfortunately it seems that this proposal is not being given the serious attention it deserves in spite of clear evidence of the size of the impact it could make on levels of economic activity in both developed and developing countries. Policy makers and analysts are cautiousin part through genuine uncertainties but in part, one suspects, because interaction with developing countries is still considered primarily a political! diplomatic matter, not one of fundamental importance for the health of the world economy as a whole, let al9ne for the levels of employment, economic activity and growth within the developed countries themselves. Yet the facts speak otherwise.
Over the last few years, a major recycling of financial surpluses to developing countries has in fact sustained economic activity in the developed countries and held the line against further deterioration in respect of unemployment, underutilisation of capacity and even inflation. The EEC, for example, estimates that there would be 3 mn more unemployed if the non-oil developing countries had cut their manufactured imports to meet the increased oil prices of 1973-74 rather than borrowing to maintain their level. By borrowing, their purchasing power has risen to account for 25 per cent of US exports and 20 per cent of EEC exports. As a result trade in manufactured goods with the newly industrialising countries alone has been found by the OECD to have created an average net gain of 900,000 jobs for the developed economies in each of the years 1973-77. Nevertheless, the likelihood of this process continuing is far from certain. The Community Annual Economic Review 1978-79 summarised the position as follows:
The present equilibrium of the world economydepends to a considerable degree on a continuing flow of private lending to the non-oil producing developing countries (and to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) on a scale unheard of before 1974 and would be called in question by any impediment to that flow. (CEC 1978, section 8) It is against this wider background that the world economy is now being called upon to adjust to a further increase in the price of oil. It is far from clear that the same recycling mechanisms will be able to operate for a further five years, starting as they do this time with the structure of international debt already considerably extended. The total outstanding debt of developing countries at the end of 1979 will already be some $300 bn and current account deficits of non-oil developing countries in this year alone are estimated to reach a new peak of at least $50 bn. This deficit could be met by increased exports and/or increased financial transfersor it could lead to a reduced level of economic activity and growth. Again we have an estimate based on past experience. Holsen and Waelbroeck (1976) The other two simulations are based on alternative ways of raising the finance: b) assumes that the $20 bn is obtained by diverting government expenditures from domestic goods and services to the transfer programme in each of the 13 industrial countries. The sum involved is roughly 1 per cent of GDP in these countries, so the net effect is, also roughly, just over twice that of increasing oda from the present average level of 0.31 per cent of GNP in the DAC donor countries to the target level of 0.7 per cent of GNP. Simulation e) assumes that the $20 bn is raised from additional direct taxation.
In both these simulations, the net impact on both developed and developing countries is substantially smaller than that of the first simulation, essentially because the positive impact of the transfers on economic activity in both developed and developing countries is offset by the negative impact of the withdrawal of effective purchasing power in the industrial countries. In the case of the transfer financed by a diversion of government expenditures, the combined effect on the GNP of the developed countries is negative: total GNP with the programme would be something under 0.1 per cent less than without the transfer-though of course GNP in developing countries would be 1.5 per cent higher.
In the case of the transfer financed by increasing direct taxation, however, the impact on both developed and developing countries would be positive: for developed countries, an increase of some 0.2 per cent of GNP, and for developing that responsibility for initiating the programme and controlling its key operations should clearly involve both developed and developing countries on an equitable basis. This is more important than the question of where administrative responsibility for the initiative would rest. As regards administration, it would obviously be desirable to work through existing institutions, if possible relying considerably upon the regional development banks, as a way of securing greater developing country involvement and of strengthening the regional focus;
that the initiative should be as substantial as the situation justifies. A programme building up within two to four years to total additional The ICFTU Review of the World Economic Situation states that there has been 'a growing recognition over the past year of the need for a massive, planned international effort to assist the developing countriesfor a new, worldwide "Marshall Plan", as advocated by the ICFTU for some years'. (ICTFU 1978: 23.) Mr. Roy Jenkins, giving the first Jean Monnet Lecture in October last year, said:
We also need to view the present economic recession in a longer-term perspective. The extent and persistence of unemployment can no longer be seen as an exceptionally low and long bottom to the business cycle. To restore full employment requires a new impulse on a historic scale. We require a new driving force comparable with the major rejuvenations of the past two hundred years; the industrial revolution itself, the onset of the railway age, the impact of Keynes, the need for post-war reconstruction, the spread of what were previously regarded as middle class standards to the mass of the population in the industrial countries. J believe that the needs of the Third World have a major part to play here. Two sources of new growth have in the past sometimes come together, the one world-wide and the other regional. (Jenkins 1977: 9-10) Yet in spite of these attempts to stimulate serious In my view it is the general argument that almost any expansion of demand, output and production would be inflationary, that needs to be challenged.
The evidence for such a rigid view of a Phillips curve relationship does not existand to base policy on the belief that the higher the rate of unemployment the lower will be the rate of inflation, is both over-simplified and misleading.2
In contrast one can argue that continuing high unemployment stimulates uncertainty and generates increasing reactions within the organised section of the labour force and among companies with monopolistic power in ways which may result in greater, rather than less, wage-push, Except for inflation, the other effects of the programme are matters of policy, not inevitability. The impact on the balance of payments of different industrial countries, for example, will primarily reflect how the size of each country's 'contribution' to the programme compares with the amount of additional exports it gets from the programme, which in turn will primarily reflect the sectors and countries supported and the institutional arrangements governing the use of the transfer funds. All these are matters of policy, which can be adjusted to match the goals and constraints affecting the countries participating in the programme. So also is the form in which the funds are raised and administered.
The need now is for one of the major governments of the industrial powers to give a strong political lead: to recognise the need for a signifIcant international initiative along the lines proposed and to provide the impetus and leadership for it to be converted rapidly into a programme for implementation. The ideas in general terms have already been much debated, but over the years not really engaged because strong political leadership has been lacking. For a proposal now to be seriously developed:
a time limit should be set for preparing a specific programme; 46 a clear mandate should be given for an international group or groups to work out the elements of a feasible programme within clear and broad basic guidelines, which recognise the different interests of the various parties involved;
for both North and South to be involved in whatever formal meetings are required to reach agreement on the proposal.
It is not argued that an initiative on these lines would solve all the major economic problems of the North or the South. In particular, special attention would be needed if the mass of the rural population in the poorer developing countries were to gain much benefit. But a major initiative for restructuring out of recession could provide a more dynamic context in which other long-standing problems could be tackled.
